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<cs>Passion, Affection, Dollars, and the Emergence of MiHavana1
<ca>Damián Fernández
<txt>Much has been written about the impact of Cuban Americans
on U.S. policy toward Cuba. From scholarly and journalistic
accounts a portrait emerges of a single-minded ethnic enclave
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whose power has commandeered (some would say hijacked)
Washington’s decisions vis-à-vis the island. The geographic
heart of the politics shaping U.S. relations with Cuba is the
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city whose name has become code for Cuban American control:
Miami. To say Miami is to say Cuban Americans.1 Both terms are
interchangeable in the public imaginary; both carry multiple,
and at times paradoxical, connotations. Power and geography have
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thus converged in a manner that seems to doom U.S.-Cuba
relations to physical and political immutability. Geography
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becomes political destiny. But is it? And if so, is it as fixed
as landmasses? Does the political geography of South Florida
condemn U.S.-Cuba relations to continuity?
While the policy circuit between Havana and Washington
usually runs through Miami, it would be an error in judgment not
to note the alternating currents flowing through it over time.2
Geographic dimensions, including demographic concentration of
1
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the ethnic group in South Florida, have been necessary
conditions to explain the decisive role Cuban Americans have
played in U.S. foreign policy, but they are far from sufficient
to explain the group’s capacity for political influence or the
variations thereof. Particularly in the past decade, significant
shifts in social and political patterns have taken place in
South Florida--some of which point to greater direct connections
between the region and the island, an emerging network that
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excludes Washington.3 As Miami and its Cuban American population
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have changed, so has the outlook for relations with Cuba. The
city is no longer the same place it was in the 1980s or 1990s.
Although Cuban Americans continue to hold significant power in
political and economic sectors, Greater Miami is not exclusively
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a Cuban enclave. It is now a pan-Latin entrepôt, the gateway to
the Americas, and with aspirations of becoming a global city.4
The Latinization of Miami and the city’s expanded financial role
would argue for relations with Cuba sometime in the future.
Moreover, the social and demographic profile of the Cuban
American community has experienced significant shifts in the
past decades, resulting in redefined political contours that
point to a new outlook as well. In tandem with exogenous
factors, both national and international in scale, endogenous
changes within Cuban Miami are ushering in a new era in the
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history of Cuban-U.S. relations. A new regional political,
cultural, and economic geography is in the making.
<a>Explaining Cuban American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy
<txt>Cuban American influence over U.S. policy came of age in
1980 with the establishment of the Cuban American National
Foundation (CANF) under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa, a
wealthy Miami businessman.5 The early 1980s were propitious for
the Cuban American lobby. The advent of Ronald Reagan’s
presidency at the beginning of the decade opened the ideological
doors to Cuban Americans who supported the president and who
were aligned firmly with his cold war redux. By that time Cubans
in Miami had garnered the economic and local political clout
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that enabled them to follow the Jewish example and become a
major ethnic lobby group, specifically in the foreign policy
arena.6
The success of the Cuban American effort can be explained
by four interrelated factors operating in tandem:
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<list1>{b}

Convergence with the presidential worldview:
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Cuban Americans were staunch supporters of President Reagan’s
international policies, especially his global anticommunist
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crusades. As a result, not only did they find a warm reception
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in the White House for their Cuban cause, but CANF lobbied in
favor of a number of other foreign policy issues on the

president’s agenda, including U.S. involvement in the Central
American conflicts.7
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<list>{b} Geographic concentration, single-issue constituency,
and a one-party minority: The political “trifecta” of geographic
concentration of a single-issue constituency with broad partisan
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uniformity has tended to exaggerate the perception of Cuban
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American power. Their demographic concentration in South Florida
gave the group electoral influence that was perceived as
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critical to win office, even at the national level.8 Politicians
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of all stripes courted Cuban American votes; to do so, they had
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to toe a hard line toward the Castro regime--the political
litmus test that all politicians had to pass with flying colors.
Cuban Americans’ overwhelming predilection for the Republican
Party (due to its hawkish disposition in international affairs
and the Kennedy administration’s blunders in the failed Bay of
Pigs invasion) provided them with a partisan foothold that
served them well. The Republican Party of South Florida, in need
of new blood in the 1970s and 1980s, welcomed Cuban Americans
and embraced their cause. Eventually three Cuban Americans from
Miami and one from New Jersey (a Democrat) would serve in the
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U.S. Congress.9 Despite the group's overwhelming Republicanism,2
Deleted: the

politicians of all stripes courted Cuban American voters. To do

2
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so, they had to support the U.S. embargo and oppose
normalization of relations.
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<list>{b} The politics of passion: In Cuban American political
culture no other issue has mustered the emotional charge that
relations with Cuba has. Such intensity is at the heart of the
politics of passion. The politics of passion is a manner of
relating to political issues that are deemed foundational,
moral, and absolute--never to be compromised.10 The politics of
passion vests politics with ethical transcendence by converting
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the mundane into a Manichaean struggle for the ultimate good.
This sort of passion can be leveraged as a source of political
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capital insofar as it can be deployed effectively to mobilize
groups and to channel resources toward a particular goal.
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Effective lobbying strategy and the power of the

dollar: While motivated by passion, CANF (and its political
action committee) was a pragmatic lobby that established a
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strong organization which partnered with other groups, stayed on
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message, supported the president on a number of political
fronts, and made financial contributions to leaders on both
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sides of the congressional aisle. Under the leadership of Jorge
Mas Canosa, a master at combining pragmatism with passion, CANF
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was guaranteed to be effective. However, barring the economic
gains of Cuban Americans, specifically the financial wherewithal
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of the businessmen who created CANF and their generous

contributions to the organization and political campaigns, the
efforts of the group would not have mounted to much. In sum,
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CANF became a consummate player in the political lobby game by
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mixing passion with dollars and effective organization.11
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These four factors in tandem explain the relative

success the Cuban American lobby garnered in a relatively short
time. But success came at a cost. The public perceived, rightly
or wrongly, that U.S. policy toward Cuba was in the grip of
Cubans from Miami, an image which Cuban Americans themselves
were eager to exploit for political purposes. The image of power
became, itself, quite powerful.
<a>The Paradox of Control
<txt>Over time Cuban Americans became represented in paradoxical
terms of control. On the one hand, this paradox of control
depicts the Cuban American community as an all-powerful
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political actor that holds the reins of decision making in U.S.
policy toward Cuba. From this vantage point the community is in
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control of the decision to isolate and pressure Cuba through the
embargo and other punitive measures. Cuban Americans, crafty
masters of the lobby game, hijacked U.S. foreign policy. If it
were not for their political influence, Washington would be free
to alter its course vis-à-vis Havana in a rational and prudent
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direction that would better serve the national interest. The
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only force keeping the United States from normalizing its
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relations with Cuba after the cold war is the recalcitrant Cuban
American minority in South Florida. Miami is the locus of power
brokerage. To get to Havana from Washington, one must pass
through Miami. But the Cuban American gatekeepers do not allow
reformers of the status quo to pass through. They are firmly in
control.12
On the other hand, the paradox of control portrays Cuban
Americans as being out of control, teetering at the edge of
irrationality, incivility, and un-American-ness.3 Operating on
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the border of America, Miami, they are trigger-happy, ready to
shoot down anyone who opposes their position on U.S.-Cuba
relations. They are all too eager to take to the streets, to
bend the rules of the political game, and to act in an uncivil
manner that approximates derangement. From this perspective,
Cuban Americans seem to be driven by an illogical (and even unAmerican) passion that challenges law and order, undermining the
American way.13 Miami is the new frontier where civilization and
barbarism encounter each other--Miami is not America. Because of
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Cuban Americans, Miami is out of control. To get Miami back,
Cuban Americans must be put in their place.
Both sides of the paradox represent Cuban Americans as
monolithic and omnipotent--a force to be reckoned with, to be
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challenged and reined in. The paradox of control ironically
3
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extends the power of Cuban Americans, who loom very large on the
screen of U.S. politics. As with all stereotypes and paradoxes,
elements of truth reside in these interpretations, but both
sides of the paradox of control neglect the steady dynamics of
change within the Cuban American community.
<a>Sources of Change
<txt>The pillars of Cuban American power have experienced
alterations that are threatening their foundations. During the
past fifteen years, a significant process of transformation has
been unfolding in the Cuban American community, resulting in
significant demographic, political, and cultural shifts. The
factors propelling the shifts are both endogenous and exogenous
to Cuban Miami. The result is that the traditional politics of
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passion of the Cuban exiles is eroding slowly, being replaced by
the politics of affection and the politics of the dollar. By the
politics of passion I am referring to the tendency in Cuban and
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Cuban American political culture to define politics as a
struggle between good and evil, a battle for absolute moral ends
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within a polarized postrevolutionary context. Although this
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Manichaean proclivity predates the 1959 revolution, it has
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thrived since the revolution and is typical of exile politics.
The politics of passion finds fertile ground in polarized
settings, such as the one that has permeated U.S.-Cuban
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relations and Cuban<n>Cuban American affairs.14
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A number of factors point to a softening of passion and a
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strengthening of the politics of affection--the functional
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connections and affective networks binding families and friends
across the Florida Straits--and to the advent of the politics of
the dollar. With increased commerce between the United States
and Cuba, the rise of U.S. business lobby groups as important
political actors interested in Cuba, and the hundreds of
millions of dollars in remittances flowing from families in
South Florida to loved ones on the island, the politics of the
dollar are starting to play a role in defining U.S.-Cuban
relations. While passion is fading, the politics of affection
and the dollar are flourishing, ushering in a transformation of
Cuban American politics. Nowhere else are these changes as
evident as in Miami. In fact, Miami (and Cuban American
politics) have changed more than official policies in Washington
or Havana. Surprising as it may seem, Miami and Cuban Americans
are at the vanguard of change in U.S.-Cuba relations.
<a>After All These Years: Fading Passion
<txt>Old political forces are passing and new ones are venturing
onto the U.S.-Cuban bicoastal landscape. The patriarchs of Cuban
and Cuban American politics are dead or dying. With the exit of
Jorge Mas Canosa from the Cuban American scene and the near
retirement of Fidel Castro, a real and symbolic changing of the
guards has occurred.15 With biology taking its toll, a younger

crop of leaders has emerged, fissures have erupted in once
seemingly monolithic elites, and generational cleavages have
surfaced. Alternatives to the traditional policy prescriptions
have come to the fore.
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The disappearance of the patriarchs who toed the extremist
line of confrontation opened the way for relatively moderate
leadership and for new power contenders to unfurl the banners of
alternative policies. After Mas Canosa’s death, CANF split into
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a hard-line faction (The Cuba Liberty Council) and a moderate
one that kept the name of the foundation and is at the helm of
the organization.16 Without charismatic leaders flaming the fire,
the politics of passion tends to flicker and become difficult to
sustain (this has taken place in the diaspora as well as on the
island). In some quarters--especially older cohorts--passion
still rules. Given the right conditions, a minority can always
try to reignite the fires of passion.
The CANF, once the preeminent and hegemonic organization,
now has to compete with both hard-{#}and soft-line
organizations. It no longer commands the dominant position it
once did. New groups that advocate for a pragmatic line of
critical engagement with the island have been formed, such as
the Cuba Study Group.17 The founders of the Cuba Study Group are
from the same elite sector that founded CANF--businessmen and
wealthy professionals--reflecting a split in the political and
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economic elite of Cuban Miami. A series of polls have shown that
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a generational shift is also occurring. Younger Cuban Americans
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express more divergent political positions than their older coethnics. The younger cohorts are less likely to support the
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embargo and less likely to base their vote in local elections on
the Cuba issue.18 The younger generations have formed a number of
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political organizations that challenge the influence of CANF and
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of the older generations. Raíces de Esperanza,4 for example,
brings together young Cuban professionals and students from a
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wide range of the political spectrum. The group fosters
connections with counterparts on the island and embraces a
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multiplicity of perspectives regarding policy choices. Raíces
epitomizes a different manner of conducting politics in Cuban
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Miami.19 Like other organizations, Raíces has learned a lesson
from CANF: how important it is to lobby Washington, although
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Raíces’ primary focus is not necessarily the White House or
Congress, but the people of Cuba.
During the past years the focus of attention of Cuban
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American organizations, including CANF, has shifted. Although
they have not abandoned lobbying on Capitol Hill, they have
redirected time, effort, and resources to political actors
inside Cuba. The center of gravity of Cuban American politics
has shifted as a result, from Washington to Havana. Again Cuban
4
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Miami is at the forefront of this change. The community is
engaging increasingly with their fellow Cubans on the island in
multiple ways--economic, political, social, cultural, and
personal.
All Cuban American political groups have found partners
inside Cuba, including, but not exclusively, among the dissident
and human rights organizations that have sprouted there since
the 1980s. This reorientation in the focus and locus of politics
is not to be underestimated, for it signals that change in Cuba
can come from within, not from without. This recent realization
tends to marginalize Washington. To get to Cuba, Miamians do not
need to go to Washington first. From the perspective of many
Cuban Americans, Washington no longer holds the key, or at least
not the only one, to unlock the future of the island nation.
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Relations with Congress and the White House are not the sine qua
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non of effective political organizing that they used to be;
political connections with activists on the island are
indispensable. The belief that political change is likely to
emerge from within Cuba is widespread in the diaspora. Surveys
have shown that over time a greater percentage has come to
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believe that transition will be led by leaders living inside
Cuba, not those living outside the island, and not by Washington
either.

Political variegation in Cuban Miami is clearly expressed
in popular attitudes and electoral behavior. Over time public
opinion has become more diverse and nuanced. Support for the
embargo has eroded from an overwhelming majority to less than
half of the Cuban Americans surveyed in 2008.20 At the same time
the percentage of Cuban Americans supporting diplomatic
contacts, cultural engagement, travel to the island to visit
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friends and relatives, legalization of remittances, humanitarian
aid, and commercial transactions between the United States and
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Cuba has increased dramatically. Age and years in the United
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States explain much of the variation and shift in attitudes:
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younger Cuban Americans advocate flexible approaches as do
recent arrivals from the island to South Florida. The latter are
committed to maintaining ties with loved ones, and they wish to
visit them and assist them by sending remittances. In this
sense, they are acting similarly to other Latin American
migrants. And like other Latino voters, Cuban Americans are
questioning their traditional support for the Republican Party.
Party affiliation among younger Cuban Americans and recently
naturalized citizens is experiencing important reorientation.
Fewer Cuban Americans than before are identifying with the
Republican Party, and more are opting to declare themselves
Independent.21
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Although the electoral politics of Cuban Americans is still
dominated by earlier exiles who are naturalized U.S. citizens,
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the trend manifesting among the more recently naturalized
citizens represents a significant challenge to the grip of the
Republican Party over this influential group of voters. While
the majority of Cuban American voters continues to identify
itself as conservative (despite a small decrease in that
identification), the conservative label hides liberal (and
Democrat-like) preferences. Deeper analyses have revealed that
Cuban American Republicans espouse positions in the areas of
social welfare and health that render them anything but staunch
conservatives. They resemble Democrats in their political
preferences on key domestic issues, which is not at all
surprising if one understands Cuba’s progressive political
culture.
What continues to connect Cuban Americans to the
Republicans is an effective party machine and the belief that
Republicans are tougher in international affairs and hence more
likely to take a strong stance against the Castro brothers.
However, even in these two areas serious fissures are
developing, specifically because younger voters are not voting
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based on Cuba-centered issues and because the harsh words of the
George W. Bush administration toward the Cuban government were
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not matched by deeds.22 On the contrary, trade with Cuba

increased despite the opposition of Cuban American Republicans.
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The Republican Party is split between competing constituencies:
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businessmen seeking markets and Cuban Americans opposing
commercial relations with the island. The chasm is unresolved.
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On the contrary, as decisions about dealing with Cuba are made
in the future, these irreconcilable differences will tend to
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push both sides farther apart.
<a>The Failure of Old Politics
<txt>In no small measure changes within the Cuban American
community are the result of the failure of the traditional
policies that both Washington and Miami have advocated in
relation to Cuba. The embargo and the host of policies intended
to exert pressure on the Cuban government have not produced the
desired outcomes of democratic change. With time the peoples on
both sides of the Florida Straits have encountered each other
and have found a wellspring of connection amidst the political
divide. Human connections resulting from family travel and
limited but impactful cultural engagement have provided new
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sources of politics at the subnational level. The reencounters
of the Cuban people have laid the foundation for a revised set
of political assumptions that have redefined the politics of
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Cuban Miami. The process started in the mid-{#}to late 1970s
when President Jimmy Carter eased travel restrictions. What
later, under President Clinton, became known as the “people to
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people” policy contributed to a reencounter of Cubans in and
outside the island that has not been mediated exclusively by the
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politics of revolutionary polarization. Pope John Paul II’s trip
to the island in 1996 also legitimized travel to the island for
religious (and often conservative) Cubans in the diaspora.23 The
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pope, in a symbolic move, opened a moral door to the island.
From then on relations between Catholic parishes have been
strengthened. Travel to the island allows for the discovery of a
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vibrant society that exists within the parameters of a one-party
system and the human connection beyond political litmus tests.
Moreover, suffering has brought Cubans together. The precipitous
decline of the Cuban economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s
pulled at the heartstrings of Cuban Americans. Remittances
flowed to the island, reaching up to one billion dollars
according to some observers. Humanitarian aid was also sent to
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the island after natural disasters.
The failure of the old politics has also challenged
political organizations and different U.S. administrations to
search for alternative policies, which helps explain the changes
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in political choices of institutions such as CANF. In part, the
choices were made possible by an altered political landscape in
Cuba, specifically the genesis of civil society represented by
human rights, dissident, and opposition groups.
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By 2009--the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution-changes within and without the Cuban American community put into
Deleted: Cuba

question the future of its effective power over U.S. policy on
Cuba and the policy’s multiple components. A new administration
in Washington is a harbinger of at least changes around the
edges of the policies. President Obama not only has a different
worldview than that of President Reagan and Bush, he has clearly
positioned himself in a more flexible spot regarding the future
of relations with the island. While additional changes are
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expected, within the first six months of his administration he
delivered on one of his campaign promises, to make travel and
remittances to Cuba by Cuban Americans much easier.24 Moreover,
President Obama owes little to the conservative side in the
Cuban American community, which did not vote for him. Rather, he
needs to reward those younger and more progressive Cuban
Americans that supported his election.
With the advent of the Obama administration there has been
the beginning of an important realignment in the convergence of
the presidential worldview with that of Cuban Americans in Miami
who favor a new action plan vis-à-vis the island. But to expect
that ideological commonality between the president and a sector
of the Cuban American population will in and of itself transform
U.S. policy is unrealistic. Despite how influential Cuban
Americans have been in the past, they have never been the sole

actors--and in the absence of Cuban Americans, the United States
would continue to find raisons d’état to try to isolate and
pressure Cuba. Even in times of close ideological convergence
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between the White House and CANF, President Reagan took actions
that did not prompt with the organization’s blessing.5 The
Clinton administration--which had crafted a shrewd two-track
policy toward Cuba (hard on the government, soft on the people)
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that found considerable support among Cubans in Miami--decided
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to return to his father in Cuba Elián González, the six year-old
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boy who survived a shipwreck in the Florida Straits while
attempting to flee the island with his mother. This was a
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decision that the majority of Cuban Americans rejected.25 In
short, convergence with the presidential worldview is a
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necessary but not sufficient condition for an ethnic group to
influence U.S. foreign affairs.
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Diversity within the community in terms of political
preferences as well as the multiplicity of Cuban American lobby
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groups on the Hill will tend to erode the influence of the group
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as competing interests might cancel each other. In recent years,
three institutionalized tendencies are operating: a reformed
CANF (lobbying for a modicum of changes in travel and a more
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critically engaged policy), the Cuban Liberty Council (the
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conservative splinter group from CANF which continues to lobby
5
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for the maintenance of the embargo and travel restrictions), and
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the Cuba Study Group (which advocates a multilateral policy of
engagement with Cuba).
Concurrent with the changes, a level of continuity is
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discernible among the Cuban American members of Congress, all of
whom carry considerable influence over this issue and all of
whom advocate for toeing a tough line vis-à-vis Havana. The gap
between the officials representing Cuban Americans in Washington
and the popular attitudes on the ground has widened.
Congressional representatives espouse policy preferences that
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seem divorced from the real if subtle variations occurring
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within communities of Cuban origin. With the incorporation,
through naturalization, of more recent arrivals into the
electoral system, the tendency will be for the gap between
elected officials and the grassroots to close. The congressional
Deleted: elections

races in November 2008 were the first truly competitive ones in
which the Cuban American community participated in the past
decades. Longstanding Republican incumbents were given a run for
their money by Democratic rivals who, among other policy
differences, advocated for a different approach to Cuba.
With the emergence of new political actors from within the
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Cuban American community, the recent entrance of business
interests into the debate over relations with Cuba (and the
pressure within the Republican Party to accommodate the requests

from farming constituencies in particular) represents one of the
single most important factors in the future redefinition of U.S.
policy. During the eight years of the Bush administration, the
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United States became one of the island’s top trading partners.26
Due to geographic proximity, commercial relations are bound to
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increase over time. The politics of the dollar are here to stay.
<a>MiHavana or HavanaMia: The Emergence of a New Economic,
Cultural, and Political Geography
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<txt>While both the Obama and the Raúl Castro administrations are
skittish (for different reasons) about moving steadily down a
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path to diplomatic normalization, in the short to medium term
one can expect a thaw in terms of greater flexibility of
cultural and educational travel. Regardless of the timing of an
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official rapprochement, subnational forces are pushing to create
a condition of normalcy between the two nations, led in some
important ways by Cuban Americans in Miami. No other community
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in the United States is so intimately engaged with Cuba on an
everyday basis as are Cuban Americans (they travel, they call,
they e-mail, they send money transfers, they keep abreast of
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developments inside the island). No other city in the United
States is so connected to Havana and the island as is Miami.
Flights to Havana take off every day from Miami International
Airport. During any week, Cuban artists are performing or
exhibiting their work. In Miami, Cuba matters. With time, the

patterns of change evident in the Cuban American community
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indicate the coming of a new day for Cuban-U.S. relations. That
day will be marked by new politics, less passion, more
affection, and more dollars--with similarities, perhaps, to a
well-established old marriage.
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Despite the embargo, dollars are flowing between the United
States and Cuba through state-to-state channels as well as
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subnational ones. Trade has increased dramatically in the past
several years, and remittances to the island have continued to
flow, if at a decreased rate due to Bush administration
restrictions and the economic crisis in the United States. With
the rise of economic linkages and transnational networks, a new
economic and political geography is in the making.27
Transnational connections based on love, kinship, humanitarian
concerns, religion, professional affiliation, and cultural
interests are being strengthened. Official bilateral cooperation
on a number of issues (immigration, weather, drug interdiction)
continues to take place. Both serve to create a baseline for
confidence building and greater collaboration in areas of mutual
interest.
I foresee the day when Miami and Havana are the bicoastal
cities leading a hub of economic, social, and cultural
connectivity. Bonds based on love, money, and culture will
create dynamics that bring these two cities together, contouring

a new functional geography marked by connection rather than
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disconnection. This new sociocultural, economic, and
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transnational political subregion--call it MiHavana or HavanaMia
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(depending on which coast you are standing on)--will operate in
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an integrated fashion reestablishing a new borderline.28
Commerce, tourism, arts, families, and ideas will travel freely
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back and forth between the shores, connecting two cities, two
centers of population and two nations.29 But not all will be
happiness in this dawning day. The emergence of a new regional
geography brings with it the potential for economic growth and
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social mobility. In the process, some will benefit but others
will not. Inequality will rise.30 The politics of the dollar
makes friends and enemies as well. The future of U.S.-Cuban
relations will tend to be that of intimate but contentious
partners. The role that Cuban Americans will play in MiHavana
will contribute both to the intimacy and the contention.
<a>Notes
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<nts>2. For a historical overview of the connections
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between Cuba and North American see L. A. Pérez, On Becoming
Cuban.
<nts>3. Pérez-Stable, The United States and Cuba, 113<n>19,
129<n>35.
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